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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the broad question of how work in sociolinguistics should be related to 
social theory, and in particular the assumptions about cognition that can underpin that relation. 
A discursive psychological approach to issues of cognition is pressed and illustrated by a 
reworking of Stubb's review of work on language and cognition. A discursive psychological 
approach is offered to the topics of racist discourse, courtroom interaction, scientific writing, and 
sexism. Discursive psychology rejects the approach to 'cognition' as a collection of more or less 
stable inner entities and processes. Instead the focus is on the way 'mental phenomena' are both 
constructed and oriented to in people's practices. 
KEYWORDS: Conversation analysis, cognition, courtroom interaction, scientific discourse, 
discourse, sociolinguistics, racism, sexism 
How can sociolinguistics be related to social theory? This is a complicated question for a range 
of reasons. Obviously what one understands to fa11 under the puwiew of sociolinguistics is one 
issue; precisely which social theory we are talking about is another. A further complication is 
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whether we consider the relation between sociolinguistics and social theory to be additive or 
agonistic. For example, on the one hand, van Dijk's (1997) volumes on discourse studies map 
out an additive approach where various topics -ideology, semantics, register, cognitive 
representation, and so on- are treated as complementary modules that can be articulated 
together to contribute to a larger picture. On the other hand, some strands of 
ethnomethodological conversation analysis provide instead a wholesale respecification of topics, 
methods and questions. In conversation analysis, for example, the attempt is often not to relate 
institutions, as prior existing and clearly identifiable phenomena, with the more ephemeral 
waxing and waning of talk; rather institutional realities are treated as constituted in talk in a 
variety of ways as participants construct and orient to institutional goals and identities (Drew & 
Sorjonen 1997; Heritage 1997). 
In this chapter we will be taking on a discursive psychological perspective, which itself 
draws heavily on ethnomethodological conversation analysis. So we will be pressing 
respecification rather than addition in the relation between sociolinguistics and social theory. 
That is, rather than joining up pieces of an existing jigsaw more neatly we will be attempting to 
paint a rather different picture. However, we wish to avoid simply reiterating the kinds of 
arguments about the role of social categories and social context in analysis that have been 
developed in this area by Sacks (1992), Schegloff (1997) and others. Instead, we will focus in 
particular on the topic of cognition and its role in sociolinguistics and social theory. Our aim will 
be to show how the additive model breaks down when considering cognition, and therefore to 
provide further support for a general respecification. 
Much of sociolinguistics has developed against a backdrop of linguistic and sociological 
themes, and has therefore had little need to develop a formulated and explicit account of 
cognition. Nevertheless, it is common to find some version of 'perceptual-cognitivism' assumed 
in sociolinguistic research; that is, the idea that human activities are performed on the basis of 
cognitive processes of some kind acting on perceptual input, and governing behavioural output. 
Where cognition is addressed more explicitly, such as in the field of discourse processes 
(Graesser et al. 1997), the standard conceptions of cognitive psychology have often been adopted 
unchanged, with the research task treated as relating two things: features of language (grammar, 
lexical items, etc.) and inner cognitive processes. 
Ironically, as sociolinguists look toward social theory, they are often dealing with 
perspectives that make the very same cognitivist assumptions. Other contributors to this volurne 
have drawn on theorists such as Habermas and Bourdieu who, in the course of developing broad 
social theories, make a number of consequential assumptions about cognitive representations and 
processes. We do not have time or space here to map out these assumptions in any detail; but we 
hope to at least show that this would be a fruitful enterprise and that our arguments would have 
broader implications for those theories. 
We are, obviously, aware of the huge research literature in cognitive psychology, 
cognitive science and social cognition that takes a perspective very different from our own. And, 
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of course, the literature in discourse processes, including a range of contributions to van Dijk 
(1997) also makes starkly different cognitivist assumptions to the one we have developed. In the 
course of a range of publications, our argument has been that, for the most part, the research 
reported in this literature has not tested cognitivism against altematives; rather, cognitivism has 
been prrsupposed in the detail of research practices. It is striking, for example, that much 
cognitive psychology uses discursive materials (as both 'input' and 'output') but ignores their 
specifically discursive features. Put another way, cognitive psychology has ovenvhelmingly 
worked with a view of discourse untouched by (the later) Wittgenstein and Sacks. Discourse is 
treated as an abstract logical and referential system -1anguage- rather than a locally managed, 
action oriented, co-constructed resource. 
Part of the difficulty is that theoretical assumptions have become sedimented into 
method. For the most part, cognitive psychological methods (using experiments, vignettes, 
questionnaires and so on) act as a systematic machinery for wiping out the practical, indexical, 
reflexive features of discourse that discursive psychologists argue are fundamental. We have not 
space here for surveying the arguments for and against these claims -for some examples in the 
cognitive psychological domains of language, memory and attribution see the debates expressed 
and described in Conway, 1992; Edwards and Potter 1993 1999; Schmid and Fiedler 1999. The 
general point we would take from this work is that the nature of discourse is inadequately 
theorized, and this inadequacy will cause problems for any sociolinguist attempting to simply 
bolt on a cognitive 'leve1 of analysis' to a linguistic one. 
In this chapter we will take a discursive psychological approach to cognition (Edwards 
1997; Edwards & Potter 1992; Potter & Edwards in press). This will involve neither assuming 
the theorizing of current cognitive psychology nor presupposing an implicit perceptual 
cognitivism. Discursive psychology provides an alternative theorization of both language and 
cognition. Instead of considering 'language' an abstract object with systemic properties, the 
focus is on texts and talk in social practices (discourse). Instead of considering 'cognition' as a 
collection of more or less technical inner entities and processes, the focus is on how mental 
phenomena are both constructed and oriented to in people's practices. Discursive psychology 
starts with action and understands the use of words, modalities, metaphors, and so on in terms 
of the way that talk and texts are oriented to action. Likewise, it treats the huge thesaurus of 
mentalistic terms that people have available to them as a resource for doing action: persuading, 
justi@ing, accounting, flirting and so on. In this ambition, it blends into, and draws on, a range 
of work in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (e.g. Coulter 1990; Goodwin & 
Goodwin 1996 1997; Lynch & Bogen 1996; Perakyla 1995; Suchman 1987). 
A central feature of discursive psychology is its co-ordinated reworking of the manner 
in which both cognition and reality (or better, 'cognition' and 'reality') are dealt with 
analytically (Edwards 1997; Potter 1996). Its caution against literal readings of cognitive 
descriptions is paralleled by its caution against literal readings of externa1 worldly descriptions. 
In effect, both the mental world and the rest of reality are reformulated as discursive 
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constructions. This is not to claim that nothing exists under the skull or out in world, but that 
research on talk and texts as a medium for action will get into tangles by starting with the objects 
formulated and oriented to in talk and relating the talk to those objects. The reward for this 
radical conceptual reformulation is analytic coherence. 
What we mean by 'analytic coherence' is a situation where talk and texts are no longer 
being compared to 'the world' and 'cognitive objects' in a way which obscures the comparison's 
dependence on prior, but largely hidden, discursive constructions of those entities by researchers. 
Instead, talk and texts are studied in their own right for how they are constructed and organized, 
and their orientation to action, whether they involve descriptions of actions ('flirting'), situations 
('a bar'), persons ('my wife'), or cognitive states ('jealous') (Edwards 1998; Potter 1998a). 
Moreover, such descriptions work with close inferential relations between (what would 
traditionally be understood as) inner and outer realms (Potter et al. 1993). Describing an 'angry 
feeling' can be part of establishing the nature of an event as problematic; describing details of 
a person's 'insensitivity' can be part of establishing and justifiing the speaker's 'anger'. These 
interrelationships are crucial in interaction, and yet they are just the kinds of relations that are 
broken up in many of the research methods of traditional cognitive psychology. The kind of 
analytic coherence that we are trying to achieve will allow those relations to be mapped out. 
The rest of this chapter undertakes two closely related tasks. First, it will consider the 
way that cognition has been conceptualized in sociolinguistic work. Second, it will show the way 
that cognition is reconceptualized in discursive psychology. Our general argument will be 
against sociolinguistics adopting an uncritical cognitivism either directly, or in its embedding 
in broader social theories. 
Clearly the question of how cognition has been dealt with in sociolinguistics is a very 
broad one with a range of different answers. We have chosen to approach it by focusing on 
Michael Stubbs's (1997) chapter on language, experience and cognition in the recent Handbook 
of Sociolinguistics. One reason for this is that it is a high quality statement by a major figure in 
a major collection. Another is that he gives detailed examples from four important topic areas 
(racism, courtrooms, science and sexism) to illustrate his case. It thus provides an opportunity 
for some detailed reworking of our own. We hope that this will be taken as a compliment to the 
sophistication of Stubbs's work and that it will be apparent that our argumentative exposition 
is designed to make the issues as clear as possible. At the same time we are aware that Stubbs's 
chapter is not representative of al1 sociolinguistics, and that our arguments are much more in 
tune with other strands of work. With each of Stubbs's examples we will attempt to show how 
it can be understood in terms of discursive psychology rather than taken in cognitivist terms as 
evidence of cognitive processes and entities lying behind the talk. 
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1. SOCIOLINGUISTICS AND COGNITION 
Stubbs's chapter starts by highlighting potential trouble in dealing with cognition; he shows 
acute awareness of a range of dangers in framing the relation between language and cognition. 
Despite this, he does not find it easy to escape from cognitivist stories. Like us he emphasises 
the need to go beyond language structure to focus on language use. However, his general 
conceptualization of the issue is a more traditionally cognitivist one. He is concemed with 
'relationships between language, thought, and culture' (1997: 358) and with the way in which 
'language mediates experience' (1997: 364, emphasis in original). He is happy to assert that for 
most of us, at least some of the time 'language influences thought' and the question is 'the 
linguistic mechanisms at work' (1997: 364, emphasis in original). 
Note the way that Stubbs' cannot rid himself of the picture of some kind of influence 
processes taking place between two different realms. He does not himself mark the distinction 
at the surface of the skull -but that is very much the taken-for-granted currency of cognitivism. 
For discursive psychology, instead of starting with arelation between realms, the question is how 
cognitive terms and orientations figure in ihteraction. This is not merely an arbitrary analytic 
preference on our behalf; what we have tried to document over the past few years is the way that 
ignoring the practica1 use of cognitivist discourse leads to a range of consequential confusions. 
Stubbs explores four areas for considering language-thought relations: racist discourse, 
courtroom discourse, science and sexism. Let us consider them in tum. 
1.1. Racist Discourse 
Stubbs's argument concerns the role of new terms (such as scheinasylanten, a German word for 
'apparent'sham political asylum seekers') in sustaining and encouraging racism. Such 'lexical 
creations crystallize thoughts, make them easy to refer to, presuppose the existence of such 
things, and therefore facilitate stereotyped reactions' (1997: 366). As Stubbs would probably be 
the first to admit, examples of this kind do not demonstrate an influence process from language 
to thought. Yet, not only does it not demonstrate the phenomenon, the examplepresupposes it. 
It assumes that there are such things as racist thoughts that may be 'crystallized' or 'referred to' 
by particular terms and lead to 'stereotyped' (itself a term from cognitive social psychology) 
reactions. Part of what gives such constructions their suasive character is the fact that the 
discourse of thinking is itself amenable to both cognitive and non-cognitive uses. If you ask 
someone what their thoughts are on some topic you will most likely get, and most likely expect 
to get, a collection of discursive claims and propositions. They will be rather unlikely to te11 you 
about fleeting images, short-term memory stores or activations in the PN neurones. 
The problem with such examples is that they can be understood perfectly sensibly in 
discursive rather than cognitive terms. For example, we do not have to speculate about entities 
and processes under the skulls of Germans using the term scheinasylanten to appreciate that it 
provides both description and evaluation in a compact package which is likely to facilitate 
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making racist claims and, as Stubbs notes, presupposes the very existence of such people. The 
point is that scheinasylanten can be understood from a discursive psychological perspective as 
a descriptive term with a range of racist uses (although discursive psychologists would, of 
course, wish to study those uses rather than speculate about them in the abstract or by way of 
made up examples). Any cognitive consequences would have to be established, and this would 
surely involve going beyond the everyday cognitive thesaurus of words such as 'thinking', 
metaphors such as 'crystallizing', and the semi-technical linguistic detritus of academic 
disciplines which includes terms such as 'stereotyped'. 
It is not that issues of cognition are irrelevant for the study of racism; far from it. Talk 
and writing about issues of race, discrimination, and related matters is suffused with cognitive 
concerns. However, a discursive psychological perspective takes these as its topic. For exarnple, 
the notion of 'attitude' is a technical concept in social psychology; yet, when someone is talking 
about race it may be a direct practical concern as to whether they are treated as having 'racist 
attitudes'. Wetherell and Potter (1992) studied the way in which middle class Pakeha (white) 
New Zealanders made critica1 claims about minority groups. One way to produce such claims 
is as elaborate, vivid description where evaluations are carefully tied to the (constructed) 
evaluative object, and treated as intersubjective or corroborated, rather than delivered as features 
of the speaker's own psychology. Speakers are here avoiding the discourse of 'attitudes' and its 
emphasis on potentially culpable individual preferences (Potter 1998b). 
More generally, Wetherell and Potter (1992) mapped out the way a wide range of 
psychological notions -influence, information processing, stereotypes, and the notion of 
prejudice itself - became elements in the production and management of talk about race. Note 
the way this inverts the conventional practice in social research. Instead of trying to understand 
racist talk and action in terms of cognition, it is showing how racist talk and action can be 
sustained using cognitive notions. Far from cognitive notions being required to do adequate 
analysis, the analysis is facilitated by focusing on situated practices rather than cognition, where 
cognitive categories and concerns feature as part of those practices, as ways of talking, and of 
doing things with words. 
1.2. Courtroom Reality Construction 
The second topic area is courtroom discourse, and in particular the construction of reality in 
courts. Stubbs is interested in 'cases where lexical choices create frames of reference with their 
own interna1 logic, and influence perception and memory' (1997: 366). For example, he cites 
work by Danet (1980) on the language of a trial where a doctor had been accused of 
manslaughter for performing a late abortion. This emphasised the significance of descriptions 
-thefoetus was aborted vs. the baby was murdered- for the outcome. And he cites Loftus and 
Palmer's (1 974) famous study where people shown a film of a traffic accident gave different 
descriptions according to terms in the questions about it such as hit, collide, smash and bump. 
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For example, people who were asked about the cars smashing into each other were more likely 
to say that they saw broken glass on the road. 
Picking up from Loftus and Palmer (1974), Stubbs searched a large (120 million) data 
base of words to extract 'the most frequent collocates of words in the lexical field of "hitn'(1997: 
367). This identifies varied, often metaphorical, uses of hit (earthquake, hard, jackpot, recession) 
while smash tends to connote crime and violence (bottles, glass, looted, window, windscreen 
-although in this list only looted seems to strongly support the argument. Stubbs's conclusion 
is that recurrent wordings can 'fix and transmit cultural meanings.. . encode stereotypes and 
shared assumptions' (1 997: 368). Again, the ambiguity over the cognitive status of 'meanings,' 
'stereotypes,' and 'assumptions' contributes to the sense that the argument has implications for 
relations between language and cognition, while not spelling out what such implications are. Our 
point is that the plausibility of such arguments falls away when they are examined in detail. 
More significantly, the phenomena discussed here are very much the province of 
discursive psychology. The studies by both Danet (1 980) and Loftus and Palmer (1 974) show 
the world-constructive and consequential role that descriptions play in actions. However, 
showing that descriptions are world-constructive and consequential is not the same as 
demonstrating that any particular cognitive processes or entities are involved. Most importantly, 
we do not need to know about any such entities or processes to find the important phenomena, 
to study them, and to identify their implications. The analytic preference of discursive 
psychology is to study the use of descriptions innatural discourse, where their involvement with 
particular actions is more easily identified, and the temptation to abstraction into linguistics, in 
one direction, and cognition in another, is more easily resisted. Let us try and illustrate this with 
an example of our own. 
In the following case a suspect/interviewee 'A' is telling a police officer 'B' of his 
involvement in a fight. The interviewee has been accused of starting the fight by 'punching' 
another man on the head. (See also Edwards 1997: 244-5). The issue at stake here is, roughly, 
why did A 'punch him in the head?' (Data from Aubum et al. 1995: 375). 
1 A :  'cos 1 was off dancing and 1 was just dancing around and I was 
2 dancing with this girl and like I've just clipped this boy's head 
3 (1 .O) and as 1 as I've clipped him I've gone oh sorry mate 
4 B: when you say you've clipped by accident d'you mean 
5 A:  yeah well I'm not gonna hit someone on the head on purpose am 1 
6 B: Yeah 
7 A:  and he's come across al1 like that and I've gone al1 right there's 
8 no need to be like that and he pushed me so we just started fighting 
9 and his mates got up and there was about four o f  them I think 
In this example we are not faced with relations between single words and particular 
outcomes, as with the Loftus and Palmer study, nor do we have abstract statistics of collocation, 
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as in Stubbs own study. Rather we have a sequence where one term (punche4 is used by a police 
officer, and other terms (clipped, hit) are used by the suspect. Considering these terms in their 
sequential location allows us to examine how A's action is played out through the altemation of 
event descriptions. A's re-formulation of his action frompunch to clip, and the explicit contrast 
between clip and hit (line 5), are part of his activity of disclaiming responsibility. Clip altemates 
with punch and hit to downgrade the contact made, as well as its deliberateness, and thereby 
reduce the attributional implication that it was enough to cause a fight, and for him to be 
responsible for that fight. These empirical, interactional details show the way the participants 
themselves are drawing causal inferences from event descriptions. 
It is important to be clear here. It may seem that we too have drifted down a cognitivist 
path when we talk of the participants 'drawing causal inferences'. Yet we are treating causal 
inferences as an activity done, and oriented to, in discourse -an activity done in the first 
instance by participants. It is handled and managed, as a participants' concem, through 
circumstantial descriptions such as 'just dancing around', 'just clipped', the narrated apology 'oh 
sorry mate' (lines 1-3), and the direct causal invocations 'by accident' and 'on purpose' (lines 
4 and 5). Thus we are committed to the implications of intentionality that follow from the 
identification of activities in discourse. Yet we are not committed to a cognitivist account of 
intentions, an account that treats them as mental events preceding talk and action. Such an 
account would be susceptible to Wittgensteinian criticisms of approaches that take intention as 
a referent for an imer state (Anscombe 1957; Coulter 1990; Wittgenstein 1980). Nor are we 
committed to a cognitivist account ofinferences. While it is no doubt true, and indeed necessary, 
that the participants here have brains, neurones, lattices of comecting axons and so on. We do 
not need to assume that there is any particular representation or process in cognitive stuff, 
however technically specified, that counts as a 'causal inference' (some biocomputer 
symbolization of an 'if x then y' variety, perhaps). 
Furthermore, we do not need to make a judgement about particular cognitive states to 
explain the interaction here. The identification of actions and inferences depends on an analysis 
of discourse and the various orientations displayed in it. Note, for instance, how B picks up the 
causal implication of A's use of the word clip in line 4, and how A ratifies that implication in 
line 5. Thus discursive psychology draws on the same analytic resources provided by the 
sequential, recipient organized nature of interaction that have been used so successfully by 
conversation analysts (Heritage 1995). For more developed analyses of examples of this kind, 
see Edwards (1997). 
1.3. Scientific Reality Construction 
Stubbs describes science as an area 'where concepts and syntax seem to have developed 
together' and where 'this development is amenable to empirical text analysis' (1 997: 369). He 
leans heavily on Halliday and Martin's (1993) study of scientific language, which he describes 
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as starting: 
... from two clear facts. ( 1 )  Scientifíc and everyday language are very different: e.g., it is well 
known that certain syntactic features, such as passive and nominalization, are common in scientific 
language. (2) Scientific and everyday world views are very different, indeed science often rejects 
common-sense understandings. 
Siubbs (1997: 369) 
What Halliday and Martin are taken to be attempting is a 'functional' account of scientific 
discourse, but not one that is functional in the manner of discursive psychology. It is functional 
in that it is 'looking for a cognitive explanation of the heavily nominalized style of science' 
(1997: 369, emphasis added). 
We have a range of problems with Halliday and Martin's (1993) study and Stubbs's use 
of it. However, the important issue here is what is being claimed about language and cognition, 
and in particular the influence of the latter on the former. Let us put to one side the implications 
for the historical development of scientific discourse that arise from this account. For if the 
heavily nominalized style of science is to be explained as a consequence of thinking 
scientifically then it would be important to demonstrate that it was not merely imported from 
legal discourse. Historical studies have suggested that scientists such as Robert Boyle looked to 
the law for models of empirical justification in the mid seventeenth century (Shapin and Shaffer 
1985). Do some of the stylistic features of scientific writing reflect this disciplinary emigration? 
Do they reflect the legalistic, judgmental nature of scientific publishing decisions where a jury 
of one's peers has become modern peer review? That would be a consequential line of research 
for verifying these claims. However, that is not an enterprise that we are able to tackle here. 
Moreover, the difficulties we have with Halliday and Martin are more direct. 
First, take the two 'clear facts'. The way they are constructed to set language over against 
views and understandings, makes it seem that what is being described are straightfonvard 
parallels between language and cognition. Yet, as we noted in the previous sections, terms such 
as view and understanding allude to cognition, but in their normal use are not equivalent to the 
sorts of mental processes and representations that are the currency of cognitive psychology. They 
are cognitive by innuendo only; they do not rely on cognitive objects or processes as understood 
by cognitive psychologists understand them, to make sense. 
Second, the 'clear facts' themselves are far from clear. Halliday and Martin (1 993) studied 
scientific texts, formal writing, and compare this to a generic, rather under-specified everyday 
language. The trouble here is that scientific language is far from confined to formal texts. Studies 
of scientific discourse have found that there are wide differences between the way scientists talk 
at the lab bench, or when they are interviewed by sociologists, and how they write in journal 
articles (e.g. Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Lynch 1985; Myers 1990). When scientists are talking 
to one another about experiments, observations and colleagues, their talk is not suffused with 
passives and nominalizations. Note the significance of this. Ifthe role of scientific language was 
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cognitive, emerging out of and sustaining scientific thinking, we would expect this form of talk, 
this register, to be involved when scientists are practicing science itself rather than (merely) 
representing it in formal wrinen reports. 
From a discursive psychological perspective we can ask why it might be that this particular 
kind of language is used in scientific articles. Put another way, can we identify plausible 
practica1 reasons for this kind of writing? Two complementary possibilities have been suggested 
(Potter, 1996). First, the impersonality provided by passivisation and nominalization may reduce 
conflict in an area of life where conflict is commonplace or even essential, and where it could 
considerably distract from the business at hand. Second, such constructions enable descriptions 
to be produced which minimize the actions and commitments ofthe writer; the scientist becomes 
almost a bystander while the data take on a textual life of their own, agents which are able to 
point, show or imply. That is, the formal discourse of scientific articles is rhetorically oriented 
to constructing the factual out-there-ness of scientific phenomena. This suggests that the 
character of scientific writing is at least as plausibly explained by its interactional and persuasive 
role than by any congruence with the cognitions of individual scientists when they are designing 
experiments, developing theories and so on. 
This leads to a further problem with Halliday and Martin's (1993) 'clear facts'. Although 
the formal writing of scientists may be very different from the kind of informal talk that takes 
place in a telephone cal1 between friends, it is similar, in certain ways, to other areas of non- 
scientific discourse. For example, a search through a year's US radio and television news on CD- 
ROM shows that passive constructions such as 'it was believed' are commonplace. Potter (1 996) 
has suggested that the detailed operation of these constructions may be to do with the complex 
set of issues surrounding fact construction, footing and accountability that arise in news 
reporting. Such constructions report beliefs, which may be crucial to the general news narrative, 
while avoiding potentially problematic attributions of that belief either to the news organization 
or its agents, or to possibly interested parties to the story. The detail is less important here than 
the broad point that when considering constructions such as these in context, as parts of 
narrative, as attending to issues of accountabiliíy, as managing concerns with footing, we can 
start to identify specific activities that are being done which make sense of why they take the 
form that they do, in the context that they appear. What seemed on superficial examination to 
be an esoteric discourse of science may be better understood as a generic discursive form for 
constructing talk and texts in complex social settings. An appeal to some cognitive realm beyond 
that is unnecessary and misleading. 
1.4. Sexism 
Stubbs' final example is rather less developed than the other three. Even though it is presented 
as a further exploration of relations between language and cognition, it mainly describes 
frequencies of usage of words such as his vs. theirs, or boy vs. girl in spoken English and 
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children's literature. Again, the inferences about the role of cognition are made more by 
implication or assumption, than by spelled out argument about identifiable cognitive entities, 
states and processes. For exarnple, Stubbs writes that sexist language 'uses lexical and 
grammatical resources to represent the world from the point of view of the male' (1997: 370). 
This alludes to the perceptual cognitivism, but does not spell out the 'point of view' metaphor. 
It is not unusual for such metaphors to be used to highlight certain features of practices without 
buying a specific mental ontology. 
As before, we should emphasise that our concem is not that the distribution of 
constructions such as his and theirs is not important; the point is how it is important. 1s it through 
its influence on some inner stuff -e.g. mental stereotypes, prototypes, representations- or is 
it necessary to go beyond that to study the involvement of particular constructions in practices? 
For discursive psychological work on sexism, the focus has been more on the way accounts are 
constructed to simultaneously present unequal employment situations as natural and inevitable, 
and to present the speaker as caring and egalitarian. That is, the concern has been with the 
practical role of discourse. Let us illustrate this with some examples. 
Wetherell, Stiven and Potter (1987) studied the way men talked about women's career 
opportunities during open-ended interviews. In contrast to much previous work on this topic, the 
attempt was not to understand how what was said might be a clue to some underlying cognitive 
entity -an attitude or stereotype of women's' career advancement. Rather, the interviews gave 
them the opportunity to provide extended descriptions, explanations and judgements as they 
dealt with a range of questions and comments from the interviewer. Close analysis of the 
interviews found a regular pattem. On the one hand, the men supported theprinciple of women's 
career opportunities and attacked discrimination based on gender. On the other hand, the men 
offered a wide range of practical reasons for the failure of women to reach full employment 
equality, including references to such concems as childcare, tradition, and emotional 
unsuitability to stressful work. Note the significance of this pattem. These men have the ability 
to affirm both support for women's' employment equality (in principle) and support for 
continued inequality (because of important practical concerns). They could be 'unequal 
egalitarians', supporting the unequal status quo yet displaying themselves as non-sexist through 
their abstract support of egalitarian principies. 
Take another discursive study in this tradition. Gil1 (1993) studied the way radio 
controllers' accounted for the low representation of female DJs when interviewed about the 
topic. Her findings repeated the general pattem in the Wetherell et al. (1987) study; the 
controllers supported the principle of equality yet drew on an elaborate repertoire of practical 
reasons for not appointing more women DJs. However, in this study the participants were 
describing their own recruitment practices rather than addressing hypothetical examples. It is 
notable that they constructed accounts to present the lack of recruitment as a product of externa1 
factors rather than their own desires; for example, few women apply. women do not have the 
appropriate skills. or listeners do not like women's 'shrill' voices. 
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In both of these studies the focus was one the way accounts were built to make a situation 
of inequality appear natural, inevitable or at least justifiable. Neither focuses on the particular 
terms used. However, Speer and Potter (2000) studied talk that drew on potentially heterosexist 
terms (queer, butch, dyke). They showed the way that speakers attend, in a range of different 
ways, to potentially negative implications. These speakers were simultaneously rnanaging issues 
of identity and assigning blame and responsibility. Their conclusion is that psychological work 
on heterosexism tends to obscure such flexible discursive practices and reify such discourse 
phenomena into stable, causal attitudes within individuals. For us, the interest is in the way a 
cognitivist account of this discourse becomes problematic when the practical and action oriented 
nature of the talk is allowed to enter the research. These studies start to show the value of 
studying sexism in terms of a range of practical tasks that people are performing with their talk 
and texts. 
Cognitivism has the same dangers in research on sexism as in the work on racism. It risks 
reducing a social phenomenon, sustained through a range of practices, to features of individual 
psychological operation. This is a complex area in which there are deep and delicate issues to 
do with the management of analytic and political concerns (see Edwards, 2003; Kitzinger & 
Frith 1999; Wetherell 1998; Wetherell & Poner 1992). Our view is that cognitivisrn is likely to 
compound the confusions here. 
11. SOCIOLINGUISTICS, COGNITIVISM AND DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
We hope that Michael Stubbs's will not rnind us using his handbook chapter in this way. It 
allowed us to deal with one of the most up-to-date and canonical examples of the manner in 
which sociolinguists deal with cognition. We have attempted to do three things with it. First, we 
have tried to demonstrate that the substantive claims about the relation between language and 
cognition can, in every case, be questioned. Second, we have tried to show that the writing draws 
on an under-theorized cognitivist image of the relations between the inner stuff of cognition and 
the observable phenomena of talk and texts. Third, we have tried to show that this inner stuff is 
itselfrarely theorized specifically (using the technical apparatus ofsocial cognition, for example) 
but is alluded to by the use of metaphors such as 'crystallize' and ambiguous terms such as 
'thinking'. More generally, we have tried to take the four topics, which Stubbs treats as 
paradigms for cognitive interpretation, and show how the phenomena can be, and have been, 
tractable to a discursive psychological analysis in terms of the involvement of discursive 
constructions in practices. 
What lessons do we draw from this for sociolinguistics? There is an interesting parallel 
here with arguments about cognitivism in psychology. One of the features of psychological 
research methods is that although they are so dependent on discourse, they break that discourse 
up into vignettes, tick boxes and so on. That is, they systematically strip off the indexical, 
rhetorical features of discourse that discursive psychologists, and other researchers in the 
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conversation analytic and ethnomethodological tradition, have shown to be fundamental. Once 
talk is separated from its action orientations in this way it becomes much easier to treat it as an 
expression of underlying cognitive processes and states. Without dealing with them in detail, 
there is a danger that traditional collocation and distributional techniques, for example, can lead 
to cognitivist conclusions for the same reason. They take words out of their sequential and 
rhetorical context, thus allowing them to be more easily imagined as products of underlying 
cognitions. 
Our wariness of cognitivism leads us to be wary also of the kinds of large-scale social 
theories that have been proposed as enriching sociolinguistics or connecting it to broad social 
and political issues. 
Take Bourdieu for example. He has frequently been identified as a social theorist who can 
make important links to sociolinguistics. And his notion of habitus -roughly dispositions that 
generate practices, perceptions and attitudes - has been treated as particularly important, as has 
the idea that there is a specifically linguistic habitus -the particular dispositions involved in 
language use, including voicing, the use of the lips and so on. It might appear that the notion of 
habitus avoids the pitfalls of cognitivist accounts we have highlighted because of its emphasis 
on dispositions which are prior to, and generate, perceptions, attitudes and so on. However, his 
account of practice is strikingly similar to mainstream cognitive psychology where cognition is 
not conceptualized as restricted to explicit terms or propositions, and certainly not to conscious 
images or representations. Rather it presupposed that there is some psychological system that 
is developed over time and enables storage, processing and the generation of output. 
Moreover, it is striking that, for al1 his emphasis on practice, Bourdieu equally gives 
precedence to visual perception and the role of schemata in producing 'meaning'. To illustrate 
these strands in his thinking we have highlighted some of the cognitivist tropes in an illustrative 
extract from his work: 
The perception of  the social world is the product of  a double social structuring: on the 'objective' 
side, thisperception is socially structured because the properties attached to agents or institutions 
do not make themselves available to perception independently, but in combinations whose 
probability varies widely [...] on the 'subjective' side, it  is structured because theschemes of 
perception and woluation . . . [The] plurality of  world vieivs.. . is linked to plurality ofpoints of 
view..  [and] to al1 the cognitive strategies ofSulfilment which produce the meaning of the objects 
of the social world by going directly beyond visible attributes by reference to the future or the past. 
Bourdieu (1991: 234-5) 
Bourdieu is an interesting and sometimes exciting theorist, and we are not suggesting that 
his work has no value for sociolinguists. However, we would caution against an uncritical 
adoption of some of the assumptions his work makes. In particular, it seems to end up with a 
surprisingly traditional notion of the psychological individual bringing their linguistic habitus 
to a particular social context. For the reasons developed above, we believe that such assumptions 
would lead to analytic incoherence if his work were uncritically bolted on to a detailed analysis 
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of discourse. We suggest that analysts will benefit from adopting a stance that presupposes 
neither cognition nor reality but addresses both as they are constructed and oriented to in  
discourse. This path may seem to duck some ofthe big concems of  social theory, but we believe 
it to be interesting, analytically coherent, and fruitful. 
'An earlier version of this article was published in: Coupland, N,, Sarangi, S. & Candlin, C. (Eds). (2001). 
Sociolinguistics andSocial Theory. London: Addison Wesley Longman. We would like lo thank Nik Coupland, 
Srikant Sarangi and Chris Candlin, and Longman publishers for permission to reprint this article. 
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